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Abstract 
Over the last decade protest has become an enduring feature of the post-apartheid political 
landscape. Despite this wave of protest the African National Congress (ANC) has retained its 
dominant status, securing 62% of the vote in the last national elections held in May 2014. The 
endurance of the ANC’s electoral support in spite of the high levels of protest has led leading 
political commentator Susan Booysen to conclude that protests in South Africa form part of a 
‘dual repertoire’ of political contestation. She argues that protests are used to signal 
grievances to the ANC between elections but that, ultimately, people remain loyal to the party 
of liberation. This article interrogates Booysen’s claim through advancing an analysis of 
voting district and ward level data in protest hotspots. The article argues that there are 
weaknesses in the methodological base of Booysen’s thesis. By analysing the support for the 
ANC amongst the estimated eligible voting age population, this article suggests a different 
relationship between voting and protesting in post-apartheid South Africa.  
Introduction 
Political participation is often held as one measure of the quality of democracy but what is 
considered as political participation is often viewed through a narrow conceptual lens 
dominated by the concerns of the Global North, focussing upon electoral turnout and 
membership of trade unions and political parties (Norris 2002). Studies of participation in the 
Global South tend to study what have been termed ‘invented’ or ‘invited’ spaces of political 
participation (see Cornwall 2002, Hickey and Mohan 2004, Miraftab and Wills 2005, 
Cornwall and Coehlo 2007, Coehlo and von Lieres 2010). However, these are usually studied 
as analytically distinct spaces and the connections between the two have not been adequately 
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theorised. McAdam and Tarrow (2010) argue that in democratic societies that protest and 
voting are amongst two of the most significant ways in which conflict in democratic systems 
can be registered. However, the relationship between these two forms of what could be 
termed ‘invited’ and ‘invented’ forms political participation is often under-researched and 
under-theorised (although see Norris 2002; Bernhagen and March 2007; McAdam and 
Tarrow 2010; Alexander 2012). This article considers the relationship between these two 
modes of political participation in the context of South Africa. 
Since 2004 South Africa has witnessed a growing protest wave primarily emanating 
from the predominately Black1 and socio-economically marginalised townships and informal 
settlements (Alexander 2010). The protests are most frequently described as ‘service 
delivery’ protests reflecting the common demands protestors generally raise for the provision 
for housing, water and electricity in these under-developed areas. Many of these protests have 
been disruptive or even violent in nature with roads barricaded, tyres burnt and government 
buildings such as clinics and libraries burnt down, a tactic reminiscent of the struggle against 
apartheid (Alexander 2010; Von Holdt et al 2011). These protests have been described by 
Peter Alexander as ‘insurrectionary’ and ‘amounting to a rebellion of the poor’ (Alexander 
2010: 25). Scholars such as Susan Booysen (2007, 2012) are critical of the idea that such 
protests are rebellious and point to the continuing electoral dominance of the ANC in the very 
same poor communities that are at the heart of protest activity. She argues that in South 
Africa protest form part of a ‘dual repertoire’ which poor communities use to fight for service 
delivery between elections but that protestors ultimately remain loyal to the party of 
liberation at election time (Booysen 2007: 22). While the African National Congress may 
continue to dominate electoral politics, securing 62% of the vote in the last national elections 
of 2014, analysts have highlighted the decline in voter turnout, particularly amongst young 
people (Schulz-Herxenberg 2009, 2014a, 2014b). Indeed, voter turnout has declined rapidly 
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over the twenty years of South Africa’s democracy from a high of 86%2 in 1994 to 57% in 
2014 (Schulz-Herxenberg 2014b). While the decline in turnout may be seen as a 
‘normalisation’ of democracy (Carlin 2006) it may also erode the legitimacy of democratic 
institutions and arguably weaken the quality of democracy, particularly in a dominant one 
party state such as South Africa (Schulz-Herxenberg 2014b).  
Commentators have noted that protests in South Africa are characterised by their 
highly localised nature, often taking place in only a particular section of a settlement (Bond 
and Mottair 2013). This, I argue, necessitates a methodological approach which goes beyond 
the analysis of municipal or ward level data to analyse the voting districts in which protest 
has occurred. The article analyses the election results of three protest ‘hotspots’3: three 
informal settlements in the Gauteng province: Thembelihle, Barcelona and Driezick 
Extension 4. As well as analysing the actual result this article further advances the study of 
South African elections by placing the results in the context of the estimated eligible voting 
age population (EVAP). In so doing, the article challenges the methodological base for 
Booysen’s thesis and presents an alternative approach. In the three cases presented there is a 
general trend of decline in electoral support for the ANC between 2004 and 2014. Yet, this 
has not directly translated into support for opposition parties. The article suggests that in a 
dominant one party state, such as South Africa, voters may be choosing to abstain from 
voting as a sign of their political dissatisfaction. However, these claims are provisional as the 
study of voter abstention in South Africa is an area in need of further research. 
 
South Africa’s Contentious Democracy 
South Africa held its first democratic ‘one person, one vote’ elections on 27 April 1994. In 
the twenty years since South Africa has held five national elections in which the ANC has 
dominated, securing over 60% of the vote in every election (Schulz-Herxenberg 2014a). 
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Although multiple parties contest South Africa’s elections, the dominance of the ANC means 
that few scholars understand South Africa to be a multi-party democracy, as Booysen 
suggests (Booysen 2007: 21). Most scholars agree that South Africa should be understood as 
a dominant party system which has implications for the quality of democracy and electoral 
participation (see Giliomee et al 2001; Habib and Taylor 2001; Southall 2001; Habib and 
Schulz-Herxenberg). Although the main opposition party in South Africa, the Democratic 
Alliance (DA), has been growing for many voters it is still not regarded as a feasible electoral 
alternative to the ANC. In large part this is related to the history of the DA, the product of a 
merger of the Democratic Party with the National Party, the party which led the apartheid 
regime. The legacy of apartheid means that, as Mattes (2014) highlights, ‘race’ continues to 
play an important role in South Africa’s electoral politics. Numerous studies have 
demonstrated that a key attribute that voters examine in South Africa is whether a party is 
considered to racially and ethnically inclusive. In the South African National Election Survey  
only 39% of respondents considered the DA to be racially inclusive (cited in Mattes 2014: 
183). Although Booysen (2007) argues that dissatisfaction with the ANC can be expressed at 
the ballot box through voting for opposition parties, a lack of feasible alternatives may make 
this an unviable option. The result of the ANC’s electoral dominance, Schulz-Herxenberg 
suggests, is that the party has ‘little incentive to improve its accountability and responsivess’ 
(2014b: 1). In light of this, it could be argued that in a dominant party system protest has a 
greater significance as a form of political participation and expression. 
Although there are debates regarding how protests should be counted, by most 
measures protest has been increasing (see Alexander 2010; Nyar and Wray 2012; Duncan 
2014). Figure 1 presents data on protest captured from media reports by the Rebellion of the 
Poor protest monitor based at the University of Johannesburg. As the chart shows protest has 
been increasing since 2004 with at least one protest a day occurring in 2012. 
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[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Protests most commonly centre around demands for ‘service delivery’, the provision 
of basic services such as housing, water and electricity in townships and informal settlements. 
For Booysen protests are a ‘mechanism’ used by communities to gain better service delivery 
(2007: 21). However, a number of commentators have suggested that protests are not just 
about service delivery but are reflective of wider concerns about deepening inequality and a 
wider crisis in in the quality of South African democracy (Friedman 2012; Evans 2014; 
Alexander et al 2014a). In this way South Africa’s protest wave has resonance with the wider 
global protest movement. In Europe and North America the issues raised by the Indignados 
and Occupy movements have critiqued the failings of representative democracy and 
demanded the more equitable distribution of resources in society (Burawoy forthcoming). 
Although protests in South Africa have not taken on the mass character of their counterparts 
in the North, with protests in South Africa generally smaller, more decentralised and 
dislocated from one another, there are similarities in the concerns and demands expressed.4 
This is particularly apparent if one considers how many protests in South Africa express 
concerns with accessing urban land which exceeds the narrowly conceived ‘service delivery’ 
paradigm and speaks to wider issues of post-apartheid land redistribution, reconciliation and 
justice. Therefore, I argue that so-called service delivery protests should not be solely 
understood as a mechanism through which to gain service delivery, as Booysen suggests, but 
be understood as an expression of wider concerns about the quality of South African 
democracy. 
Analysing election results in post-apartheid South Africa 
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Susan Booysen has been the leading political commentator in assessing the link between 
voting and protesting in South Africa. However, there are a number of methodological 
weaknesses in her approach including her selection of protest sites and her analysis of 
election data. In a 2012 article Booysen undertakes an analysis of local government election 
results of seven protest areas; Ermelo, Ficksburg, Umtata, Wesselton, Green Village, 
Ipelegeng and Rustenburg. Booysen provides no methodological rationale as to why these 
areas were selected. Some areas such as Ermelo and Ficksburg were at the heart of large scale 
protest activity in 2011. Ficksburg is etched into the memory of many South Africans after 
the death of protest leader Andries Tatane at the hands of the police was captured on film. 
The protest sites that Booysen selects have often been the site of large but often one-off 
protest actions rather than areas of sustained protest. I argue that in order to assess the 
relation between protesting and support for the ANC one should look at areas of sustained 
protest. The cases selected for analysis here have been based upon data collected by the 
Rebellion of the Poor database based at the South African Research Chair in Social Change at 
the University of Johannesburg. The database has collected over 2,000 media reports on 
protest from 2004 until the present (see Runciman et al 2015). The three areas identified for 
this article are amongst the most protest-prone areas between 2009 and 2014, according to the 
database. The cases selected are all located in Gauteng which is reflective of the high levels 
of protest in the province but was also necessitated by the methodology which required local 
knowledge of these areas, as will be discussed further below. 
As outlined above, protest in South Africa is a highly localised phenomena, often 
taking part only within one section of a ward, the geopolitical subdivisions of municipalities. 
In her analysis Booysen (2007, 2012) frequently draws upon municipal level results. 
However, I contend that the social composition of municipalities which frequently include 
well-serviced and more affluent areas that have not embarked upon protest make this 
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problematic for drawing out the relationship between support for the ANC and protesting. 
Booysen does make use of ward level data that provides a more accurate level of analysis, but 
even ward level data presents problems for analysing the relation to protest in South Africa. 
As I have argued, protests frequently only occur within particular sections of a ward, most 
frequently areas of informal settlement or areas which experience comparatively poorer 
levels of service delivery. As table 3 demonstrates while the majority of ward 77 have flush 
toilets this is of little comfort to those living in the informal section of Barcelona which until 
2012 had no access to water-borne sanitation. Furthermore, wards can also include areas of 
differing racial and socio-economic characteristics as is the case in ward 5. Ward 5 consists 
of a Thembelihle, large informal settlement populated predominately by Black Africans, and 
a section of Lenasia, a formerly Indian-only township. Given the differing voting patterns 
amongst race groups in South Africa (see Lodge 1999) and the differing socio-economic 
conditions it becomes problematic to draw conclusions about Thembelihle from ward level 
data. Thus, in this article I use both ward and voting district data to analyse the relationship 
between support for the ANC and protesting. Analysing election results at this level required 
local knowledge from residents in order to identify the areas which have undergone the most 
sustained protest in their ward and necessitated a focus in Gauteng.   
This article also provides a different approach to the analysis of election results than 
that used by Booysen. Booysen uses only the overall percentage by which the ANC won the 
ward or municipality and the number of seats this translated to within the municipality. What 
this overlooks is the importance of the declining turnout and a consideration of what role 
abstention may play. As I will go on to demonstrate, while the ANC may be able to retain a 
high vote share this is based upon a decreasing electorate. I argue that in order to fully 
understand the relationship between support for the ANC and protesting, election results need 
to be interpreted through an analysis of the actual number of votes cast as well as placing this 
8 
 
analysis within a calculation of the estimated voting age population (EVAP). To date, 
analysis of voting results amongst the EVAP have tended to be done at the national and 
provincial level (Schulz-Herxenberg 2009, 2014a, 2014b). However, there is a need to take 
this analysis further. In this article estimates for ward level EVAP have been supplied by 
StatsSA. No equivalent data could be obtained for the voting district. These figures have been 
calculated through counting the number of dwellings within the voting district and estimating 
the population through the average household size for the ward and then calculating the 
proportion of the population eligible to vote based upon ward level data drawn from the 
census. While this measure may not be entirely accurate using both the figures for the ward 
and voting district together builds a more comprehensive picture of voting trends in protest 
hotspots than has been previously available.  
By looking at ward and voting district level data more closely this article presents an 
alternative methodological lens through which to analyse the relationship between voting and 
protesting. In so doing it questions the role of abstention. Voter abstention is most commonly 
seen as a result of voter apathy or, in newly transitioned societies, as evidence of the 
‘normalisation’ of democracy (Carlin 2006: 639). For Booysen, abstention is seen as a ‘mild 
form of punishment’ (2012: 300) for the ANC with her identifying ‘real’ punishment as a 
vote for the DA. While voting for the DA may indeed be a punishment to the ANC it 
overlooks the political reality in which most South Africans find themselves unable to select 
a viable opposition party, as argued above. In such a context, I argue that the role of voter 
abstention should therefore be examined more closely.  
To date, there have been very few studies of voter abstention in South Africa (but see 
Lodge 1999, HSRC 2014). Indeed, voter abstention is a phenomenon that is under-studied in 
the continent generally. When low voter turnout is examined it is usually with reference to 
how institutional mechanisms cause low voter turnout and how these mechanisms can be 
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improved (see Kersting 2007, Kuenzi and Lambright 2007). The reasons individuals may 
hold, particularly the political reasons, for abstention are largely left unexamined. Without 
further research it is difficult to provide definitive reasons for voter abstention, whether this 
represents political apathy, a ‘normalisation’ of democracy or, as I suggest here, a form of 
protest. These are issues that need further theoretical and empirical consideration and this 
article provides some suggestions for future research in this area. 
Analysing the 2014 National Elections 
The 2014 national election arguably presented the ANC with the most significant challenge 
to its electoral dominance with one poll showing a fall in support for the ANC from 63% in 
November 2009 to 53% in November 2013 (Southall 2014: 2). A number of events provide 
context for understanding this decline in support. The killing of 34 striking platinum miners 
at Marikana on 16 August 2012 has been recognised by a range of political commentators as 
a significant turning point in South African politics (see Gumede 2012, Alexander 2013, Saul 
and Bond 2014). Indeed, Pallo Jordan, former Minister of Arts and Culture, has said the 
massacre has caused the ANC to lose its legitimacy (Jordan cited in Saul and Bond 2014: 
244). Furthermore, corruption continued to dog the ANC exemplified by the outcry 
surrounding the estimated R200 million (approximately18 million US dollars) ‘security 
upgrades’ made to President Zuma’s private residence. The ANC also faced dissention within 
its own ranks with open divisions within its alliance partner Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU), which were deepened following the resolution of its largest affiliate the 
National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) not to endorse the ANC’s 2014 
electoral campaign and to explore the formation of a worker’s party. 
On the electoral terrain the ANC would be challenged by a new party, the Economic 
Freedom Fighters (EFF), led by expelled ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema. While 
there have been previously splits from the ANC the significance of the EFF is that it has been 
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the first break to the political left from the ANC. With a focus on ‘economic freedom’ 
Malema and his party spoke to the frustrated aspirations of young people, many of whom are 
unemployed. Furthermore, the elections themselves were held in the midst of what would 
become a five month strike in the platinum sector and in a continuing wave of community 
protests. 
Despite the difficulties faced by the ANC it was returned as the governing party with 
a decreased but still sizable 62% of the vote. It may therefore appear that despite the 
widespread nature of protest, as Booysen suggests, the dominance of the ANC has been 
largely left unchallenged. However, a more considered analysis of the elections results which 
analyses the support for the ANC amongst the EVAP, the level of voter abstention and a 
focus upon the protest-prone province of Gauteng reveals a more complicated picture and 
provides evidence to suggest a fragmentation of the ANC’s support. 
Looking at national election results between 2004 and 2014 (table 1) reveals that the 
since 2004 between 40% and 43% of the EVAP has abstained from voting. As a result, the 
percentage of the EVAP voting for the ANC is under 39%, with the levels of support broadly 
comparable between 2004 and 2009 amongst the EVAP and declining slightly in 2014. 
During this period opposition parties have been making small increases in their share of the 
electorate.  
[Insert table 1 here] 
 
Looking at Gauteng reveals the most fundamental shifts in support for the ANC. The 
Gauteng province is a key economic driver in South Africa and comprises nearly a quarter of 
the total population. It is also the province which has been at the heart of protest action 
(Alexander et al 2014b). Despite a turnout, which was higher than the national average, 
Gauteng’s 2014 national election results reveals a considerable drop in support for the ANC 
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in comparison to the national result (table 2). In Gauteng the ANC lost 292 265 votes to what 
Faull calls the ‘triple threat of apathy, the DA and the EFF’ (2014: 3). The DA grew its 
voting share from 22% to 31% and the EFF received 40% of all of their national ballots in 
Gauteng (Faull 2014; Schulz-Herxenberg 2014a). While the decline of the ANC’s vote share 
may be attributed to the levels of protest in the province a number of commentators have 
linked the increase in the DA’s share of the vote to changing voting trends amongst the Black 
middle classes (Friedman 2014). Therefore, in order to understand what, if any, relationship 
voting has to protest one must analyse the areas in which protest happens.  
[Insert table 2 here] 
The Ballot and the Brick: Thembelihle, Barcelona and Drieziek Extension 4 
Informal settlements are often areas prone to high incidences of protest (see Alexander 2010) 
and the fact that all three of the case study areas comprise a large percentage of people living 
in informal settlements is significant. Informal settlements are not only areas which are often 
protest prone but are also inherently precarious spaces. The population of informal 
settlements can grow very rapidly but equally can informal settlements can be destroyed by 
the State, a further dimension that Booysen neglects in her analysis. 
 All three areas were first settled informally between in the late 1980s and early 
1990s; Thembelihle in 1989, Barcelona in 1992 and Drieziek Extension 4 in 1994. In all three 
areas the ANC was influential in leading the settlement of the land however, the three 
communities have fared differently over the twenty years of South Africa’s democracy. 
Thembelihle is perhaps faced with some of the most difficult conditions. As table 3 reveals 
ward level data reveals that within the ward boundaries under which Thembelihle is 
demarcated 71.6% of the ward live in informal housing with 76.9% of the ward having no 
access to a flush toilet. The area was declared a transit camp in the 1990s and is thus 
somewhat regularised with stands marked out and an informal road system through which 
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vehicles are able to pass (Wilson 2005). As the area has not been declared a township the 
municipality refuses to provide electricity and the residents have taken to making illegal 
connections (Dugard and Tselapedi 2013: 59). Although Thembelihle has been in existence 
for thirty years there are plans to remove the settlement and resettle its people elsewhere due 
to the fact that the settlement is placed upon dolomitic land which therefore makes it unsafe 
for building although the community disputes the extent to which the land is dolomitic 
(Dugard and Tselapedi 2013). This resettlement and the lack of other basic services have 
been a continuing source of protest in the area.  
Barcelona was established in 1992 through a so-called land invasion which was led by 
the ANC. Like Thembelihle the informal settlement has been regularised with stands marked 
out for each shack. Since 1994 government subsidised housing, commonly referred to as 
RDP housing, has been built in the area however, as table 3 demonstrates nearly a quarter of 
the population within the ward remain in informal housing. Amongst the areas of informal 
housing until 2012 there was no electricity of water-borne sanitation in many parts of the 
settlement which became the focus of a series of protests in 2011. 
Drieziek Extension 4 was first settled in 1994 when the municipality allocated the 
land for people to live informally. Since its establishment, no government-subsidised housing 
has been built. The brick structures that exists are either the result of people building their 
own houses or as a result of projects undertaken by Non-Governmental Organisations, as a 
result as table 3 shows 34.7% of the population in ward 5 live in informal housing. The area 
that has been at the heart of the protest activity has no water-borne sanitation and the dirt 
roads are impassable by vehicles in many places. The lack of water-borne sanitation was at 
the heart of protests that erupted in 2012 and since then sewage pipes for water-borne 
sanitation have begun to be laid. Although the three areas have broadly similar histories the 
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voting trends reveal divergent trends in support for the ANC, opposition parties and 
abstention.  
[Insert table 3 here] 
 
Voter turnout and abstention rates in the protest hotspots 
Since 1994 voter registration and voter turnout although still high has been decreasing. Such 
trends fit with other post-transition states (Norris 2002; Carlin 2006). However, a decline in 
the participation in one of the key practices of democracy may raise questions over 
democratic accountability and durability. Table 4 demonstrates a decrease in voter 
registration amongst the EVAP in both ward 8 (Thembelihle) and ward 77 (Barcelona), an 
estimated decrease of 20.8% and 14.9% respectively. Only ward 5 (Drieziek) has 
demonstrated an increase in voter registration above that of the national average. Similarly, a 
decline in turnout was observed in both ward 8 and ward 77 with an increase in ward 5. For 
both ward 8 and ward 77 abstention rates have increased between 2004 and 2014 with nearly 
two thirds of the EVAP abstaining from voting. Thus in two of the three protest prone wards 
examined here there has been a decrease in electoral participation amongst the EVAP of 
around 16%, a rate higher than has been documented at the national level. From informal 
interviews conduction in Drieziek it would seem the beginning of a project to lay sewage 
pipes in the area shortly before the election may have played some role in influencing people 
to vote. 
[Insert table 4 here] 
How the ANC polled in protest hotspots 
Table 5 compares the actual results for the specific voting districts most affected by protest, 
based upon information gathered from residents. An analysis conducted at the voting district 
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rather than at the ward or municipal level is, I contend, the most accurate way in which to 
analyse the relationship between voting and protesting. As noted above, protest in South 
Africa is a highly localised phenomenon and it is rare for a whole ward to protest. Thus 
looking at the results of particular voting districts can grant better insight into the relationship 
between voting and protesting.  
An analysis of the overall results alone demonstrates a high degree of electoral 
support for the ANC. In Drieziek Extension 4 the ANC has consistently polled over 80% in 
the last three national elections. However, as table 5 demonstrates in Thembelihle and 
Barcelona there has been a decline in the actual electoral support for the ANC.  In 
Thembelihle the ANC have dropped their vote share by 17.5% since 2004 and by 11.1% in 
Barcelona. An analysis of the results in the context of their vote share amongst the EVAP 
shows a further decline in the levels of support. Thus although the ANC has consistently 
polled above 80% in Drieziek Extension 4 once these results are placed in the context of the 
EVAP a different picture is revealed, with support for the ANC declining by a quarter. In 
Thembelihle support for the ANC amongst the EVAP has declined to a low of 15.1% in 
2014. While in Barcelona the ANC’s support amongst the EVAP declines from from over 
40% in 2004 to a low of 28% in 2014, comparable to national averages. Table 5 illustrates 
that in these protest hotspots the ANC is experiencing a steady decline amongst the voting 
population and the electorate more generally, contrary to Booysen’s thesis. 
[Insert table 5 here] 
Support for opposition parties in protest hotspots 
Table 6 provides an analysis of the election results all opposition parties combined. It was 
decided to use this measure as, aside from the DA, none of the most significant opposition 
parties, the Congress of the People (COPE) and the EFF, have contested all three of the 
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national elections between 2004 and 2014. With the decline in the support for the ANC 
observed above we may expect to see a corresponding rise in support for opposition parties. 
Table 6 shows that in Thembelihle and Barcelona opposition parties have doubled their share 
of the vote while more modest gains have been observed in Drieziek Extension 4. However, 
when these results are placed in the context of the EVAP the gains made by opposition 
parties have been much smaller. This may suggest that many voters are choosing to abstain 
rather than vote for an opposition party, contrary to Booysen’s expectations. However, as 
argued above, voter abstention is an area in need of further research. 
[Insert table 6 here] 
Voter abstention in post-apartheid South Africa 
Vote boycotts have played an important part of South Africa’s history as a form of protest. 
Under apartheid the United Democratic Front (UDF), one of the leading anti-apartheid 
movements, led a vote boycott against the newly formed tri-cameral parliament which 
established electoral representation for Coloured and Indians but still excluded the Black 
African majority (Van Kessel 2000). In post-apartheid South Africa vote boycotts have been 
employed by various different political actors. This strategy was first used by the Landless 
Peoples’ Movement in 2004 mobilising around the slogan ‘No Land! No Vote!’ Later in 2006 
a similar campaign was taken up by the Anti-Eviction Campaign and Abahlali baseMjondolo 
around the slogan ‘No Land, No House, No Vote’. It has also been taken up in various local 
organisations and in the run up to the 2014 elections many communities, such as Bekkersdal 
and Sterkspruit, threatened to boycott elections (see Mgaqelwa and Ntshobane 2013; Mkhize 
and Raubenheimer 2014). Furthermore, in the build up to the 2014 elections former minister 
of intelligence Ronnie Kasrils led the Sidikiwe-Vukani (Vote No) campaign. Although this 
was widely misunderstood as a call for a vote boycott, Kasrills and others actually called for 
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a vote against the ANC (Nicolson 2014). These calls for a vote boycott have generally not 
gone much beyond the organisations calling for them although they have had traction within 
the membership of these organisations 
Outside of organised vote boycott campaigns, various interpretations are provided for 
explaining voter abstention. Institutional arrangements and the registration process are 
common factors used to explain voter abstention (see Jackman 1987; Wolfinger 1991; 
Lijphart 1997; Kersting 2007; Kuenzi and Lambright 2007). Of the reasons for abstention in 
the 1999 election, 39% of respondents cited not being registered, Lodge highlights this was 
largely linked to the need to have a ‘bar-coded’ identity document which many citizens in the 
new South Africa did not yet possess (1999: 10). In more recent times, administrative barriers 
to electoral participation have declined with less than 15% of respondents in the HSRC voter 
participation surveys conducted in 2008, 2010 and 2013 citing not being registered as a 
reason they would not vote if there was an election tomorrow (HSRC 2014: 25). 
Others scholars concentrate on demographic variables such as class, gender and age in 
determining electoral participation (see Avey 1989; Moyser and Day 1992; Hill and Leighy 
1999; Evans 2000; Fornos et al 2004). Indeed, Lodge (1999) highlights the role of race in 
voter abstention with higher rates of abstention in the Asian, White and Coloured respondents 
in the 1999 national elections. However, this work has not been followed up by another 
analysts meaning we have little analysis of the demographic variables that may influence 
voter participation in South Africa.  
Apathy is also given as a common explanation, surveys conducted by the HSRC 
(2014) show that disinterest and disillusionment accounted for over 65% of the responses as 
to why respondents would not vote if there was an election tomorrow. However, as Henn and 
his colleagues (2002) highlight a reluctance to engage in the formal process of voting may 
not signal a disinterest in politics as a whole. Indeed as Bhavani (2010) highlights one of the 
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limitations of quantitative studies on political behaviour is that the understanding of politics 
is based on a narrow conception of formal political participation and therefore neglects a 
broader understanding of politics. Therefore abstention need not automatically be associated 
with apathy as choosing not to vote may be an expression of wider political dissatisfaction 
(Karklins 1986; Kang 2004). A limitation of the voter participation surveys conducted by the 
HSRC is that respondents are presented with a list of what could be characterised as ‘negative 
options’ to explain disinterest and disillusionment. What is excluded is an option in which not 
voting can be considered as an expression of political dissatisfaction but also an active 
concern with politics. As argued above, the nature of South Africa’s democracy, which is 
dominated by one political party, means that voting for an opposition party is not widely 
regarded as a feasible alternative. Thus as Kang argues ‘if there is no alternative, the choice 
will be between abstention and continuous support for the party but those who want to 
respond to the decline of quality have only one option: abstention’ (2004: 84). 
Analysis conducted by Ryabchuk (2014) of 76 interviews conducted with voters and 
non-voters on 2014 election day further supports the argument that abstention may be a 
political statement to register citizens dissatisfaction with the quality of democracy. For many 
South Africans the concept of democracy is strongly tied to the reduction of socio-economic 
inequalities (Mattes et al 2000: 9-10). This is perhaps unsurprising given the historical 
experience of apartheid in which an exclusionary citizenship was constructed around racially 
stratified rights to housing, basic services and employment, creating vast racialised 
inequalities which continue to permeate today (Miraftab and Wills 2005). Thus as Ryabchuk 
finds many non-voters cite a lack of change in their livings standards as their reason for not 
voting. While apathy may be an important element in explaining voter abstention in post-
apartheid South Africa there is also a case for understanding it as part of an expression of 
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political dissatisfaction in the absence of credible opposition parties. It is clear that further 
research is required on the reasons for non-voting in post-apartheid South Africa. 
A problematic feature of Booysen’s thesis is to assume that people who protest also 
vote. There is some evidence to suggest that protestors may be more likely to abstain from 
voting. An exit poll conducted in 16 areas, many of which were protest-prone areas, by the 
South African Research Chair in Social Change at the University of Johannesburg showed 
that of the 3,782 voters surveyed only 30.8% had participated in a protest in the last 5 years 
(Paret n.d.). Furthermore, if one considers the general demographics of protestors, generally 
young people, it further raises the possibility that protestors are more likely to abstain from 
voting. In the last election only 22.6% of 18-19 year olds were registered to vote and only 
54.5% of 20-29 year olds (IEC 2013: 6). 
The majority of explanations for voter abstention are informed by scholarship from 
the Global North. While this does not make the theoretical and empirical observations of 
these scholars redundant it is important to note such work is not meant to directly apply to 
many of the democratizing contexts of the Global South. As I have argued, voter abstention is 
an under-theorised and under-researched area. By highlighting this gap, this article raises an 
important area for future research which, I contend in the South African context, at least, will 
become increasingly salient as new political formation and parties increasingly seek to 
challenge the ANC’s hegemonic position in a dominant party state.   
Concluding remarks: Protest, Political Participation and Opposition in South Africa 
How can the relationship between protest and voting be understood? Do we see a 
‘rebellion of the poor’ as Alexander would argue or does the continued, albeit dented, support 
for the ANC suggest a maintenance of the status quo, as Booysen would contend? This article 
has drawn attention to weaknesses in the methodological base of Booysen’s thesis. As an 
alternative, I have advanced the analysis of the relation between protest and voting through 
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an analysis of ward and voting district level data in three protest hotspots. By placing the 
analysis of these results within an analysis of the EVAP, this article as demonstrated that the 
level of support for the ANC in protest ‘hotspots’ is not as stable as previous analysis 
conducted by Booysen has suggested. The analysis presented here has highlighted the 
increasing trend in voter abstention at all levels: national, provincial, ward and voting district. 
Thus, although the ANC still enjoys a wide degree of electoral support this is based upon 
declining numbers of voters. This article has argued that voter abstention is an important 
phenomenon in post-apartheid South Africa in need of further research.  
Booysen dismisses the political significance of the current protest wave for not 
resulting in a decisive break away from the ANC. However, what this fails to appreciate is 
the incremental and often contradictory ways in which resistance to a hegemonic force will 
be forged. While I have argued there are similarities between the global protest wave and 
protest in South Africa, a distinctive feature has been the fragmented nature of these protests. 
Some commentators have termed protests in South Africa as ‘popcorn’ protests reflecting the 
way in which they rapidly spring up but often equally as rapidly subside (see Bond 2011, 
Bond and Mottair 2013, Mottair 2013). The use of such terminology is problematic as it 
belies the complex dynamics of protest, which are mostly hidden from public view: the 
numerous attempts to engage the authorities and the rounds of community meetings which 
usually proceed a protest. While authors employing the term are correct to highlight that the 
high level of protest activity in South Africa has yet to coalesce into a social movement that 
would raise collective demands or pose a challenge to the political dominance of the ANC, 
this does not mean such protests should be dismissed as insignificant. Scholars such as Piven 
and Cloward (1979) highlight that collective action outside of movements may actually be 
more effective than collective action organised through more formalised social movement 
organisations. Furthermore, I argue that the kinds of community-based concerned residents 
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groups which are often in the forefront of leading protest are an important political and 
democratic space. While most community-based organisations lead protests around the basic 
provision of services, as I have suggested, such protests are often also about a wider struggle 
about the content and quality of post-apartheid democracy. Such forums provide an important 
outlet for critique to the ruling ANC which do not exist elsewhere. While so-called service-
delivery protests may be primarily engaged in issue-based politics, the frequency and the 
widespread nature of such protest action means that in the absence of effective opposition 
parties that they should not be under-estimated as a political force. 
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1 This article follows the general conventions used in analysing ‘race’ in South Africa. Thus, the term ‘Black’ 
refers to all the non-white groups designated under apartheid (Black African, Coloured and Indian). While also 
using the terms ‘Coloured’ and ‘Indian’ to refer to certain sections of the Black population. While using these 
terms may run an acknowledged risk of reifying ‘race’, the particular history of apartheid means that these 
categories still have a lived reality both in terms of how people identify themselves but also in the enduring 
patterns of socio-economic exclusion.  
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Poor protest monitor at the University of Johannesburg. This term is used to distinguish these areas from areas 
of more sporadic or ‘one-off’ protest activity. 
4 My thanks to Marcel Paret for sharing this idea with idea with me. 
                                                            
